How to Sue an Asue? Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Through the Transplantation of a Cultural Institution by Heron, Cyril A.L.
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
Volume 26
2021 
How to Sue an Asue? Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Through the 
Transplantation of a Cultural Institution 
Cyril A.L. Heron 
Cornell Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Law and Race 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cyril A. Heron, How to Sue an Asue? Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Through the Transplantation of a 
Cultural Institution, 26 MICH. J. RACE & L. 171 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol26/iss1/14 
https://doi.org/10.36643/mjrl.26.1.how 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
171
HOW TO SUE AN ASUE? CLOSING THE RACIAL 
WEALTH GAP THROUGH THE TRANSPLANTATION OF 
A CULTURAL INSTITUTION
Cyril A.L. Heron†∗
Asues, academically known as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (or 
ROSCAs for short), are informal cultural institutions that are prominent in 
developing countries across the globe. Their utilization in those countries provide 
rural and ostracized communities with a means to save money and invest in the 
community simultaneously. Adoption of the asue into the United States could serve
as the foundation by which to close the racial wealth gap. Notwithstanding the 
benefits, wholesale adoption of any asue model runs the risk of cultural rejection 
because the institution is foreign to the African American community.
Drawing upon principles of cultural and legal transplantation, successful 
transplantation of cultural institutions is possible where parameters that provide 
contextual stability are put in place. Given that the most prominent drawback to 
ROSCAs is the risk of default and embezzlement, the contextual stabilizer to 
prevent cultural rejection should be one that secures the ROSCA from said default 
and nefarious members. Therefore, I propose that trust law can be that context 
stabilizer because it would provide legal recourse and mitigate the inherent risks 
involved in asue participation.
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Introduction
Marsha Hadassah Curry was a force of a woman. Born into a 
household of modest means in a “third-class British Colony” known as 
the Bahamas,1 she nevertheless proved an eager and inventive entrepre-
neur. Curry owned a barber shop, apartment complexes, and, her crown-
ing achievement, a women’s home for victims of domestic violence.
While she did not attain the fame and prominence that mark other entre-
preneurs across the globe, Marsha Curry deserves no fewer accolades.
Curry, a woman without any tertiary education, built her empire out of 
nothing through the use of an ingenious cultural tool: the asue.2
“Asue” is the Bahamian word for an informal association of people 
who pool their money for budgeting and saving purposes.3 The group 
chooses a set contribution rate, a custodian who holds and distributes the 
amalgamated money for the group (known as the “pot”), a set timetable 
to determine when to pay into the pot, and an order in which to receive 
1. So described by the Duke of Windsor, Edward VIII. MICHAEL BLOCH, THE DUKE 
OF WINDSOR’S WAR 364 (1982).
2. Marsha Curry was a close family friend whose family has been as close as blood to my 
own for at least four generations. Growing up, a favorite story to hear about Marsha Curry was 
how she managed to accomplish so much. Those stories more often than not featured asues.
3. Quinton Lightbourne, What is an Asue?, NASSAU GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2018), repro-
duced in the INTERNET ARCHIVE WAYBACK MACHINE, https://web.archive.org/web
/20200807005009/https://thenassauguardian.com/2018/11/09/what-is-an-asue/
[https://perma.cc/X3G6-BTYX]. See, e.g., Therese Turner-Jones, Three Ways the Caribbean 
Can Strengthen Financing for Private Companies, INTERAMERICAN DEV. BANK: CARIBBEAN 
DEVTRENDS (May 16, 2016), https://blogs.iadb.org/caribbean-dev-trends/en/three-
ways-the-caribbean-can-strengthen-financing-for-private-companies/ [http://perma.cc/LV9K-
A438] (“Growing up in The Bahamas, I remember my grandmother’s asue. There weren’t any 
banks where she lived on the island of Inagua, and even if there had been, it wasn’t customary 
for women to frequent them. To adapt, women (and sometimes men) formed their own in-
formal savings groups, known as asues.”).
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the draw—the specific pay period when a single member is entitled to 
take the pot.4 Each member of the asue gets a single draw until all mem-
bers have received the pot, at which point the asue may start over or dis-
solve, according to the whims of the members.5
Interestingly, the savings club is not unique to the Bahamas or even
the wider Caribbean. Although the asue is the version unique to the Ba-
hamas, it is one iteration of what scholars call Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs).6,7 ROSCAs are arguably ubiquitous in 
the developing world8 and serve the needs of people who either have no 
access to, or are geographically isolated from, formal financial institu-
tions.9 African Americans in the United States similarly often lack finan-
cial empowerment by, or are ostracized from, the formal financial sector. 
Thus, the ROSCA is primed for importation into the African American 
context.10
In a 2019 study on the economic impact of closing the racial wealth 
gap, researchers found four major indicia of unmet needs in family 
wealth-building in the African American community: (1) Community 
Context; (2) Family Wealth; (3) Family Income; and (4) Family Savings.11
4. See Lightbourne, supra note 3.
5. Lihle Z. Mtshali, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Those Sou-Sou Savings 
Clubs African and Caribbean Women Love, ESSENCE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.essence.com/lifestyle/money-career/what-is-a-sou-sou-savings-club-facts/
[http://perma.cc/VTB7-6EPS]. While “asue” is the Bahamian term derived from the word 
“partner” in many African languages, the change in language and the spread of African 
slaves throughout the Caribbean naturally resulted in divergent words for the informal 
institution, which we can see with the term “susu” or “sousou” used in the article. Com-
pare id., with Lightbourne, supra note 3. See also, Turner-Jones, supra note 3 (“Asues, susus 
or panderos, as they are known in Spanish-speaking countries . . . .”).
6. Cf. Sudhanshu Handa & Claremont Kirton, The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations: Evidence from the Jamaican ‘Partner’, 60 J. DEV. ECON. 173, 174 (1999) (describing 
what a ROSCA is).
7. Henceforth, the terms “ROSCA” and “asue” will be used interchangeably throughout 
the paper. For purposes of distinguishment, ROSCA is the general term whereas asue is the 
more specific term. The two will be explained in depth in Part I.
8. See Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 193; F.J.A. Bouman, Indigenous Savings and Credit 
Societies in the Third World. A Message, 1 SAVINGS & DEV. 181, 181 (1977). See, e.g., Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotating_savings_
and_credit_association [http://perma.cc/CB66-7ZKR] (last modified Aug. 24, 2020) (listing 
the various names for ROSCAs in different languages around the world).
9. See Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 193; Bouman, supra note 8, at 183.
10. African American is used to be more specific, since according to the U.S. Census Bu-
reau, “Black” can also refer to Americans with Caribbean or African ethnicity as well. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU GLOSSARY, https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_BlackorAfrican
American [http://perma.cc/HC6V-NNWH] (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
11. Nick Noel, Duwain Pinder, Shelley Stewart III & Jason Wright, McKenzie & Co., The 
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Respectively, community context refers to the public and private assets 
held by a community; family wealth refers to the wealth accumulated by 
a single family, including financial and nonfinancial assets; family income 
refers to the cash flow a family receives; and family savings refers to how 
families interact with the rules and the tools that govern savings and 
wealth creation.12 Most dishearteningly, the authors note that African 
American families have not only less access to affordable financial tools 
but also less of a support network, because most of them are poorer to 
the point where they would not know someone who could lend them 
$3,000.13
This is where ROSCAs could fill a vital role. African Americans 
could take the first step to improving their financial stability through 
ROSCAs, which are ideal for individuals who lack access to trust-
inspiring or proper financial facilities,14 and where quick access to funds is 
necessary.15 For example, if one had to pay an impending school fee, a 
ROSCA could expeditiously provide those funds without the drawn out 
process of applying for a loan and facing possible rejection. In this way, 
the asue could help one gain a little more control over one’s financial sit-
uation.
Amongst the myriad considerations regarding the African American 
population’s use of ROSCAs, one comes to the fore: how does one in-
spire a population to take up this informal, and largely culturally-specific, 
institution that is completely alien to them? That question is even more 
critical when one considers that ROSCAs operate on trust and social 
connectedness to ensure continued payment into the pot past one’s 
draw.16 While the literature argues that there are inherent protections that 
ensure the sustainability of ROSCAs once formed, other sources reveal a
modern reality where ROSCAs are plagued by deceitful and dishonest 
members and custodians.17
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Bouman, supra note 8, at 183.
15. See Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 176 (“Roscas provide a solution to the ‘lumpiness’
problem in societies where capital markets are incomplete or fragmented, so that the only al-
ternative is to save individually for a length of time to mobilize the funds required to purchase 
a particular (usually durable) commodity.”); Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, 
The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 792, 793 (1993) 
(“[T]hey seem more appropriate for dealing with significant, idiosyncratic events, rather than 
the hump saving required for old age.”).
16. See Besley et al., supra note 15, at 794 (“Since those who receive the pot early are effec-
tively in debt to the other group members, Roscas too would seem vulnerable to problems of
nonrepayment, with individuals refusing to honor their membership commitment after win-
ning the pot.”).
17. E.g., Lightbourne, supra note 3 (“But in recent times this once reliable way of saving 
money for Bahamians has been plagued with dishonest and deceitful people who don’t put 
their money in the asue for every draw, or, even worse, the asue holder goes missing and steals 
the money out of the pot. It’s an unfortunate reality we have come to live with.”); Denise 
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In addition, like all plans of mice and men, transplanting an institu-
tion between two contexts tends to have unpredictable outcomes. That is 
especially so when transplanting what is essentially a cultural institution 
without the transference of ingrained cultural safeguards.18 In the Baha-
mas, the long history with asues has ensured the presence of safeguards, 
both cultural and legal, for the institution.19 Hence, the central thesis of 
this Article becomes apparent: ROSCAs are informal financial institu-
tions that are prominent in the developing world across the globe. Their 
adoption into African American culture writ large would allow African 
Americans to progress further down their road to financial freedom.
Notwithstanding the benefits, wholesale adoption of any ROSCA model 
cannot be directly imported without an intervening construct that fills 
the gap left by the culture of ROSCA-practicing groups that ensures ad-
herence to the duty of payment into the pot. Thus, I propose that trust 
law could be the contextual stabilizer necessary to facilitate adoption by 
African Americans because it provides an avenue for legal recourse with-
out stifling the informality that is a central feature and benefit of the insti-
tution.
This Article shall proceed in three parts. First, the Article will ex-
plore ROSCAs in more depth. Over the past three decades, researchers 
have conducted a plethora of studies of ROSCAs, from economic to so-
ciological. An analysis of those studies will lay bare the ostensible benefits 
and detriments of the ROSCA model. Second, the Article shall pivot to 
general cultural transplantation theory and legal transplantation theory, 
both of which provide examples of pitfalls that arise when cultures adopt 
institutions from one another. Transplanting institutions from one culture 
to another cannot occur with the desired effect, without the inclusion of 
a context stabilizer. The necessary context stabilizer for this solution is 
addressed in the third Part of this Article. Notwithstanding the unanimity 
of ROSCAs across the developing world, they are still culturally specific, 
and the safeguards that ensure success of ROSCAs rely on cultural pun-
ishments to prevent the dishonest from defaulting or attempting to ab-
scond with the pot. Instituting legal recourse via trust law could provide 
the added layer of protection necessary to transplant ROSCAs into the 
Maycock, Women Demanding Money from Failed Asue After Court Ruling, TRIBUNE (Jul. 29, 
2016), http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/jul/29/women-demanding-money-failed-
asue-after-court-ruli/ [http://perma.cc/67AM-8YZY] (recounting a court case brought by 
members of a failed asue).
18. Cf., e.g., William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1992), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1585&context=yjil [http:/perma.cc/SRU9-RKZS] (discussing the tension created by the new 
Italian Criminal Code based on the adversary system and the lingering civil-law philosophical 
outlook).
19. See e.g., Maycock, supra note 17 (describing that the failed asue became the subject of a 
court action); Telephone Interview with Marsha H. Curry (July 3, 2019) (corroborating that 
there is loss of face and social repercussions for those who cause the failure of an asue).
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American context. The Restatement Third of Trusts will demonstrate 
that ROSCAs already operate as effective trusts.
I. Of ROSCAs and Men
As mentioned previously, ROSCAs are near ubiquitous in the de-
veloping world.20 From Taiwan to the Caribbean and everywhere in be-
tween, ROSCAs have long been a way for the rural and underserved 
communities of the world to access savings.21 ROSCAs around the world 
share similar features as collective efforts of people who contribute to a 
common fund at regular intervals and who in turn receive that fund.22
The existence across so many regions and cultures almost assures that 
there is no single ROSCA model.23 Indeed, while ROSCAs around the 
world share many similarities—enough to be encapsulated by a single 
term—the differences between them can be stark.24 Beginning with a 
more in-depth description of ROSCAs, this Part will then examine the 
benefits, detriments, and applicability of ROSCAs to African American 
communities.
A.  The Different Types of ROSCAs
Two dominant types of ROSCA models exist: the random 
ROSCA and the bidding ROSCA.25 A random ROSCA, as the name 
implies, is characterized by a randomly-determined draw.26 On the other 
hand, a bidding ROSCA involves a draw that is determined by how 
much an individual bids on a position in the queue.27 In the Taiwanese 
context, bidding ROSCAs schedule meetings where members who have 
not yet received the pot get the chance to bid for their turn.28 The person 
20. Bouman, supra note 8, at 181.
21. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 792.
22. See, e.g., Alvin Etang, David Fielding & Stephen Knowles, Trust and ROSCA Member-
ship in Rural Cameroon, 23 J. INT’L DEV. 461, 461 (2011); Shirley Ardener, The Comparative 
Study of Rotating Credit Associations, 94 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR.
201, 201 (1964); Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit Association: A “Middle Rung” in Develop-
ment, 10 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241, 243 (1962).
23. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 201-09.
24. Compare Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 174 with Jonathan Bauchet & Vance Larsen, 
ROSCA Composition and Repayment: Evidence from Taiwanese Bidding ROSCAs, 54 J. DEV.
STUD. 1483, 1485 (2018).
25. See Besley et al., supra note 15, at 792-93.
26. Id. at 792-93 (“In a random ROSCA, members commit to putting a fixed sum of money 
into a ‘pot’ for each period of the life of the ROSCA. Lots are drawn, and the pot is randomly 
allocated to one of the members.”).
27. Id. at 793.
28. Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1484.
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offering the most money is the winning bidder.29 In ROSCAs operating 
under the discount-bid rule, like the Taiwanese bidding model men-
tioned above, the remaining ROSCA members have their contributions 
reduced according to the amount of the winning bid.30 Other bidding 
ROSCAs determine the position ex ante where one’s bid is the amount 
one must pay for the life of the ROSCA.31
The Bahamian asue, however, is slightly different than the previous 
two. Like its Jamaican and Caribbean counterparts, one’s draw in a Ba-
hamian asue is determined by request or by the organizers.32 These pre-
determined ROSCAs are said to work best when the members meet fre-
quently, the draw cycles are shorter, and the membership is stable.33
B.  Benefits of ROSCA Membership
No matter the determination of the draw, every type of ROSCA 
provides documentable benefits to those who participate.34 Primarily, 
ROSCAs are a mechanism for saving.35 Intuitively, it does not seem like
paying into a pot that benefits another is equivalent to putting money in 
a savings account or under one’s mattress for safe keeping36 (also known 
as “autarky”),37 but it is.38 One’s guaranteed pot can be characterized as 
the sum of one’s savings over the life of the ROSCA,39 particularly when 
one is in the latter half of the draws.40 When one’s draw is in the first 
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1485 (“For example, in the ROSCAs we study, if the winning bid in a certain 
meeting was 150, and each member was originally designated to contribute 1000 at every 
meeting, those members who had not yet received the pot would only have to contribute 850 
that meeting, while those who had already received the pot would contribute 1000 and the 
winning bidder would receive that particular pot (made up of a mix of 850-contributions and 
1000-contributions depending how many members have already bid) without contributing.”).
31. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 797; Ardener, supra note 22, at 212.
32. Lightbourne, supra note 3; Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 175 (mentioning that a ma-
jority of the ROSCAs in their sample were allocated by the banker or by request).
33. Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1485 (positing that the incentive to default in a pre-
determined ROSCA is drastically reduced when the meetings are more frequent, the draw 
cycles are shorter, and membership is stable).
34. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 217-21.
35. Id. at 217.
36. While this may seem glib, 61 percent of adults—more than 250 million people—in Lat-
in American and the Caribbean remain outside the formal financial system. ASLI DEMIRGUC-
KUNT, LEORA KLAPPER & DOUGLAS RANDALL, THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE:
FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN LATINA AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 1 (2012), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/921241483987545446/N5lacEN-08202012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MYU2-Y5DW].
37. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 794.
38. Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 176.
39. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 795-96.
40. Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 176.
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half, the pot acts more as an interest-free loan where one is given earlier 
access to the capital needed to make important purchases.41 To put a finer 
point on the matter, autarky is inefficient, and ROSCAs remedy that in-
efficiency by shortening the waiting period for most members between 
saving for the good and purchase of the good.42 Indeed, one of the most 
prominent features of the random ROSCA is that members save at a 
lower rate over a longer period of time and can often expect to obtain 
the money for a supposed durable good earlier than under autarky.43
Thus, ROSCAs not only provide a tangible benefit to the members, but 
they also provide a benefit to the economy by ensuring that capital is 
never idle.44
Perhaps more importantly, ROSCAs can provide emergency fund-
ing in crises.45 Those who receive the pot in the earlier rounds of the 
draw are net creditors and therefore have access to a sort of loan whereby 
immediate purchase or payment can be made.46 Thus, if an emergency 
arose, joining a ROSCA could provide the money one would need to 
cover the expenses.47 For example, the costs associated with fixing a burst
pipe can range from $1,000 to $4,000.48 With approximately seventy-
eight percent of American workers living paycheck to paycheck,49 an ad-
ditional expense of $1,000 can devastate a household. Joining a bidding 
or predetermined ROSCA can provide the quick infusion of cash neces-
sary to remain above water.50 But that supposes one is not already in a 
ROSCA. If one is already participating in a ROSCA, the emergency-
fund benefit is still available because one can then bid51 or negotiate for 
41. Id.; Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1485.
42. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 795.
43. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 796-97.
44. Ardener, supra note 22, at 217 (“Members could save their contributions themselves at 
home and accumulate their own ‘funds,’ but this would withdraw money from circulation: in a 
rotating credit association capital need never be idle.”).
45. See ZNSNetwork, Covid and Asue in the Bahamas, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rf-SlB6JP_M (proposing the asue model as a crisis miti-
gator for the entirety of the Bahamas).
46. Handa & Kirton, supra note 6, at 176.
47. See, e.g., id. at 192 (reporting that fourteen percent of survey subjects who answered the 
question about ROSCA fund use stated that they used their ROSCA funds for “unplanned 
expenses”).
48. Plumbing Cost Estimator, HOME ADVISOR, https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost
/plumbing/#leak [https://perma.cc/FJK4-LBFE] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
49. Zach Friedman, 78% of Workers Live Paycheck to Paycheck, FORBES (Jan. 11, 
2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/11/live-paycheck-to-
paycheck-government-shutdown/#74955e6b4f10 [https://perma.cc/K37U-QXVT] (citing a 
2017 survey conducted by CareerBuilder).
50. See Handa & Kirton, supra note 6 at 192 (reporting that fourteen percent of survey sub-
jects who answered the question about ROSCA fund use stated that they used their ROSCA 
funds for “unplanned expenses”).
51. Supposing one chooses to join a Taiwanese-style discount-bid ROSCA. Bauchet & 
Larsen, supra note 24, at 1485.
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an earlier draw.52 McKinsey & Company’s study on closing the racial 
wealth gap mentions family savings as an important component to close.53
The aforementioned benefits of ROSCAs not only demonstrate their po-
tential to act as tools for African Americans to secure family savings, but 
also demonstrate their potential to act as tools for changing the commu-
nity context,54 as they both economically and socially empower the 
communities in which they operate. 
One of the four components of wealth generation for a family men-
tioned in the McKinsey study is community context.55 In their descrip-
tion, the authors point out that the collection of private and public assets 
in a community is one of the factors that has the power to reinforce soci-
oeconomic patterns.56 The example given is that “communities with high 
levels of economic activity and rich social networks tend to produce 
more affluent families and contain assets” that attain higher values.57
When one considers how the wealthy maintain social circles of other 
wealthy people who invest in one another, the truth of the example be-
comes more apparent.58
ROSCAs prevent capital from lying fallow59 and encourage and 
maintain community ties, particularly when ROSCAs successfully com-
plete their cycle.60 By contributing to the pot that is immediately distrib-
52. Anecdotal evidence from users of predetermined asues corroborate the idea that one can 
negotiate with other members for earlier positions in the draw. This also supposes that one had 
not received one’s pot earlier in the draw and used that pot immediately. Telephone Interview 
with Marsha H. Curry (July 3, 2019); Telephone Interview with Julian D. H. Fountain (Apr. 
23, 2020).
53. Noel et al., supra note 11, at 6-9.
54. Id. at 9. (“Community context refers to where families begin the wealth-building pro-
cess. Each community is composed of the collection of public and private assets in a given 
community. These assets overlap with the economic, social, cultural, and political networks 
and institutions that tend to reinforce existing socioeconomic patterns.”).
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 9 (“These assets overlap with the economic, social, cultural, and political networks 
and institutions that tend to reinforce existing socioeconomic patterns.”).
57. Id.
58. See Lewis Hower, Friends and Family Shares: Startup Funding Tips, SILICON VALLEY 
BANK, https://www.svb.com/blogs/lewis-hower/raising-startup-funds-friends-and-family
[https://perma.cc/XNE2-3LTS] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020); Types of Investors, FUNDABLE,
https://www.fundable.com/learn/resources/guides/investor/types-of-investors
[https://perma.cc/48RJ-L4Y2] (“[F]riends and family invest the most money in startups in 
aggregate, investing over $60BB per year. In fact, 38% of startup founders report raising money 
from their friends and family.”).
59. Ardener, supra note 22, at 217.
60. Bouman, supra note 8, at 188 (“But Jellicoe’s case material from East Africa illustrates 
that mutual aid societies and ROSCAs flourish in urban environments and are instrumental in 
the maintenance of group cohesion.”). Completion of the ROSCA cycle means every member 
in the ROSCA has received their draw, at which point the ROSCA is free to disband or re-
new.  Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1483 (“The ROSCA cycle ends when all members 
have received the pot.”). While information on happiness and completed ROSCAs are scant, 
likely because ROSCA success is rather unremarkable, one can extrapolate from firsthand ac-
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uted to a ROSCA member, money that would normally languish under 
the figurative mattress instead goes into the stream of commerce as the 
pot-winner obtains the funds to spend on her good of choice. By multi-
plying the amount of money in a pot by the interval of the draws, one 
can calculate how much money is reintroduced into a community by a 
single ROSCA. Even more importantly, business owners can also enter 
into ROSCAs and funnel the money into their business or even start 
new ones.61
Pivoting to the power of ROSCAs to empower communities, 
F.J.A. Bouman asserts in his influential paper that ROSCAs are capable of 
maintaining group cohesion, solidarity, and interaction.62 ROSCA meet-
ings act as a forum to facilitate interaction between members and encour-
age the exchange of news, help members locate employment or lodgings, 
celebrate members’ successes, and more.63 Guyanese women interviewed 
by Caroline Hossein noted that ROSCAs restore “personal pride” and 
morale to Black business owners.64 Corroborating Bouman’s solidarity 
assertion, Hossein reports that people in her community of focus, the 
slums of Kingston, Jamaica, are “very close and intent on helping one 
another,” and that the ROSCAs help do that.65 Extrapolating from Hos-
sein’s points, a ROSCA provides two-fold gratification: personal pride in
community perseverance, and altruistic mirth. Thus, ROSCA participa-
tion encourages broader community involvement and identity through 
mutual support between the individual and the community at large.
ROSCAs serve as an alternative to rigid and formal financial sys-
tems.66 Participants benefit from ROSCAs as a means to save money, as 
a source for an emergency loan, and as a method of community socioec-
onomic development. They are powerful vehicles for financial inclusion 
of those excluded or willfully removed from formal financial institutions.
Their informality, however, does have drawbacks that warrant discussion 
as well. 
counts of people satisfied with ROSCAs that their experience was positive and involved 
ROSCAs that successfully concluded. See, e.g., Caroline Shenaz Hossein, Fringe Banking in 
Canada: A Study of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in Toronto’s Inner Suburbs,
8 CAN. J. NONPROFIT & SOC. ECON. RSCH. 29, 36-37 (2017) (documenting the story of 
Natla, a Sudanese woman who credits a community inclusion and involvement to her partici-
pation in a ROSCA).
61. Caroline Shenaz Hossein, Perseverance of Banker Ladies in the Slums, 84 ANNALS PUB. &
COOP. ECON. 423, 436 (“Nee, a 28-year-old mixed-race female who owns a hair and nail 
salon, stated, ‘Box help[ed] me start my business . . . . [It has been] passed down from genera-
tion to generation, from grandmother’s time and [Box-hand bank] helps me.’”).
62. Bouman, supra note 8, at 188.
63. Id. at 188-89.
64. Hossein, supra note 61, at 436.
65. Id. at 433.
66. See id. at 428.
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C.  Detriments of ROSCA Membership 
Though ROSCAs provide glowing benefits in many countries and 
could provide the same if exported to the African American context, 
there are cognizable detriments to the system. First, ROSCAs do not 
grow one’s wealth, unlike formal financial institutions. Because ROSCAs 
do not normally incorporate interest,67 one can only get the money one 
puts into the system.68 Additionally, some ROSCAs include fees or gratu-
ity to the custodian for their role in organizing the association, acquiring 
the pot, and doling it out.69 Paying the custodian is an added expense for
ROSCA participants, who tend to have limited means,70 which could in-
convenience members who are particularly strapped for cash. The most 
inhibitive drawback to ROSCAs, however, is the “trust factor,” i.e., 
trusting the other members and the custodian to continue to participate 
in the ROSCA and not leave with the money or disappear after their 
draw.71
ROSCAs have two primary mechanisms built in to ensure repay-
ment: (1) social constraints72 and (2) intra-ROSCA preventive measures.73
Social constraints are one of the most powerful protections the ROSCA
offers. In many communities, membership comes with a “solemn duty”
to repay.74 Public opinion, therefore, is a weapon often employed to keep 
those who seek to default in check.75 Should one’s default come to light, 
social sanctions include ostracization from any future ROSCA and a loss 
of social standing.76 ROSCAs prevail in areas where community ties are 
67. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 219 (remarking on the absence of charging interest in 
Nigeria). Interest can be built into a ROSCA model through the use of a “sliding scale” where 
those who receive their draw earlier have to pay higher amounts than those who receive the 
pot towards the end of the ROSCA’s life. Id. at 213.
68. See id. at 219.
69. See id. at 203. Anecdotal evidence of asues mention payments to the handler for their 
role that Bahamians call a “tip.” Telephone Interview with Julian D. H. Fountain (Apr. 23, 
2020).
70. See Besley et al., supra note 15, at 792, 805 (describing the typical ROSCA participants 
as individuals who tend to lack reliable forms of collateral).
71. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 216; Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1483, 1490 (cal-
culating that ten percent of the ROSCAs the authors studied encountered payment issues and 
failed to complete their cycle).
72. Ardener, supra note 22, at 216.
73. Id. at 217.
74. Id. at 216.
75. See id.; Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1483 (“[P]eer pressure and social sanctions 
are the two most important mechanism to enforce contributions, particularly of those members 
who have already received the pot.”).
76. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 216 (“In Japan there ‘is nothing dishonourable in a debt 
as such,’ but to have a debt in a rotating credit association and be unable to pay is ‘very dis-
honourable indeed.’”).
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relatively strong.77 Ergo, loss of social standing could affect everything 
from marriage prospects to community involvement to livelihood.78
Moreover, in many places ROSCAs are entrenched in the economic sys-
tem such that exclusion from them could cause severe economic conse-
quences.79 The fact that members in some extreme instances have been
driven to steal or to sell a daughter into prostitution merely to meet their
ROSCA obligations demonstrates the power of social constraints.80 Some 
have even chosen suicide rather than default.81 The severe measures men-
tioned are neither common nor inherent to ROSCA membership; how-
ever, their existence demonstrates the cascade of serious consequences of 
ROSCA default or failure.
ROSCA members also ensure payment through other mechanisms, 
including: placing any suspicious person toward the end of the rotation; 
requiring members to sign a contract; providing some form of security or 
collateral in exchange for membership; paying a fine upon defaulting; or, 
if all else fails, taking the matter to court.82 All of this notwithstanding, 
ROSCAs sometimes still fail.
The trust factor is the crux of ROSCA operation. In his article dis-
cussing this system in Cameroon, Alvin Etang notes that, absent trust-
worthiness, a ROSCA cannot exist and indeed is more likely to fail.83
One must be able to trust that the custodian and the other members will 
not abscond with one’s hard-earned money, and that the punitive 
measures are enough to prevent this theft or default.
The costs of losing community trust are high. Quinton Lightbourne 
of the Nassau Guardian advised against joining asues, the Bahamian 
ROSCA,84 writing that “in recent times this once reliable way of saving 
money for Bahamians has been plagued with dishonest and deceitful 
people who don’t put their money in the asue for every draw, or, even
worse, the asue custodian goes missing and steals the money out of the 
pot.”85 Indeed, that very scenario happened in 2016 to an asue in Grand 
77. See id. at 202-08 (listing the regions where ROSCAs are found); see also Geert Hof-
stede, The 6-D Model of National Culture, https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-
gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/ [https://perma.cc/5N33-N4K9] (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2020) (discussing Hofstede’s research on collectivist and individualist countries across 
the world).
78. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 216 (“The member who defaults in one association may 
suffer to such an extent that he may not be accepted as a member of any other. In some com-
munities the rotating credit institution has become so rooted in the economic and social system 
that exclusion would be a serious deprivation.”).
79. Ardener, supra note 22, at 216 (giving examples of communities where ROSCAs have 
become embedded in the economy).
80. Id.
81. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 805.
82. Ardener, supra note 22, at 217.
83. Etang et al., supra note 22, at 462.
84. Lightbourne, supra note 3.
85. Id.
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Bahama when four women took their asue custodian to court, arguing 
she had stolen the $6,000 they paid into the asue.86 Luckily, the women 
were able to secure a favorable judgment from the local magistrate 
court.87 But their win was marred by the inability of the custodian to pay 
back all of the money: Patricia Collie had invested $1,625, Nishka Shep-
herd $1,750, Shikia Saunders and Keisa Pinder invested $1,500 and 
$1,750 respectively.88 At the time of the article none of the ladies had re-
covered their full investments.89 Collie said that she had since lost her 
house.90 Shepherd was unemployed and raising an eleven-year-old son as 
a widowed single mother.91 These two women highlight the high stakes 
of joining a ROSCA: should the ROSCA fail, what little means the 
members had are wasted, and custodians may not be in a position to re-
pay that debt themselves. 
One tenth of the ROSCAs documented in Jonathan Bauchet and 
Vance Larsen’s survey on bidding ROSCAs in Taiwan ended up failing.92
Timothy Besley and his co-authors note that custodians in Cameroon re-
ported a rate of delinquency of up to fifty percent.93 Whether those 
ROSCAs failed due to excusable default or nefarious machinations is not 
discussed; however, in either case, trust was breached, and the trust factor 
may have been misplaced.
Given the danger that default and theft present to ROSCA partici-
pants, how can one argue for importation into the African American 
context? Well, risk exists even when utilizing formal financial institutions.
Just look at the devastation the subprime mortgage crisis caused the Afri-
can American community.94 African Americans disproportionately held 
subprime mortgages.95 When the market imploded, they were left rav-
aged: the crash wreaked havoc on the credit scores of African Americans 
and ushered in a potentially decades-long period of continued financial 
disadvantage.96 The counterargument that there are other means of resti-
tution for those harmed by the activities of the formal financial institu-
tions should not be overlooked. Particularly in the wake of the financial 
crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 






92. Bauchet & Larsen, supra note 24, at 1490.
93. Besley et al., supra note 15, at 805.
94. Ylan Q. Mui, For Black Americans, Financial Damage from Subprime Implosion Is Likely to 
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Act (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank”) established the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau.97 Dodd-Frank also tasked the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal In-
surance Office with the regulation and protection of consumers and the 
financial industry.98 Despite these institutions, the inherent risk of invest-
ing is not mitigated.99 Rather, predatory practices and consumer-
exploiting behavior are curtailed thereby.100 Thus, this preemptively ad-
vances the discussion to the object of Part Three: trust law should be 
used as the safeguard for potential African American ROSCAs. With a 
safeguard in place to offer protection and recompense to ROSCA mem-
bers, the risk of joining an association is reduced to that akin to any other 
investment. 
D. How ROSCAs Can Benefit African Americans in the United States 
Therese Turner-Jones, General Manager of the Country Depart-
ment Caribbean Group of the Inter-American Development Bank, noted 
in 2016 that ROSCAs promote financial education, savings, social inclu-
sion, and investment.101 Gowon Bowe, Chief Financial Officer of Fidelity 
Bank (Bahamas), has been calling for a return to the asue mentality where 
Bahamians trust one another and pool resources to successfully jump start 
the Bahamian economy in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.102
Both financial experts succinctly answer the question of how ROSCAs 
can benefit African Americans in the United States: (1) ROSCAs pro-
mote financial savvy that would lay the necessary foundation for financial 
savings, and (2) ROSCAs encourage community investment that would 
lay the necessary foundation for wealth empowerment. 
There is no indication that African Americans have historically 
practiced ROSCAs,103 leaving the community ripe for importation of the 
97. Mark Koba, Dodd-Frank Act: CNBC Explains, CNBC (May 11, 2012), 
https://www.cnbc.com/id/47075854 [https://perma.cc/WFL4-PCSM]; 12 U.S.C. § 5481 
(2018).
98. Koba, supra note 97; Selected Sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/dfa_
selections.html [https://perma.cc/9NFV-DBCF] (last updated Dec. 8, 2011).
99. See Harlan Landes, Four Risks of Investing, FORBES (Jun. 15, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2012/06/15/four-risks-of-
investing/#2bc2917b38f9 [https://perma.cc/EYH6-VNVT] (“No investment is without 
risk.”).
100. Koba, supra note 97.
101. Turner-Jones, supra note 3.
102. Neil Hartnell, Bahamas Needs ‘Asue’ Mentality’ for Its Recovery, TRIBUNE (Apr. 6, 2020), 
http://www.tribune242.com/news/2020/apr/06/bahamas-needs-asue-mentality-for-its-
recovery/ [https://perma.cc/ANP8-KQRB].
103. Ardener, supra note 22, at 208 (stating that notwithstanding the presence of other forms 
of mutual benefit associations, there is seemingly no documentation of African American 
ROSCAs); SIMON C. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 282 (2d ed. 
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institution. As already explored in this Article, ROSCAs provide benefits 
of improved savings, emergency funds, and community empowerment 
and investment.104 Applying those benefits to the African American con-
text, ROSCAs could help mitigate the McKinsey factors mentioned in 
Subpart B of this Part not merely by one but by two, which would make 
a world of a difference.
To exemplify the point, one ROSCA currently operates out of Mi-
ami. The membership of the ROSCA includes nurses who work togeth-
er and their friends and family.105 The membership is about twelve 
strong.106 The pot is distributed every month, and one of the nurses is the 
custodian.107 The custodian determined the draw at the outset, but trad-
ing draw dates between members is an option with this ROSCA.108
Members pay at a rate of $200 per pot, i.e., members pay $200 every 
month.109 Subsequently, the person who holds the draw for the month of
August can expect to receive $2,400. With that $2,400 the person who 
holds the August draw is free to spend it on anything. One of the mem-
bers got married in the fall. That member expressed that she would spend 
her draw on paying down money related to the wedding.110 That is one 
example of how someone may use a ROSCA draw, but other examples 
abound: one ROSCA member spends her draw on any outstanding 
home repairs; another user spends the money derived from her ROSCA 
on mortgage payments; yet another times the draw on her monthly 
ROSCA to coincide with the holidays to ensure she has money for 
Christmas gifts.111 These examples display the convenience and usefulness 
of this scheme; notwithstanding the economic crisis that the pandemic 
brought about, members know they have a means of paying, or keeping 
up with, their most pressing bills. In the event one receives an unex-
pected expense, a simple trading of the draws can secure the money in 
time to avoid any further harm. What should one do, however, if one’s 
draw came earlier than the unexpected expense? According to one of the 
members of the Miami ROSCA, she would simply join another 
ROSCA.112 In her case, she has said she has been a part of as many as 
three simultaneously operating ROSCAs.113 In her case, none of the 
2018) (“African Americans have not emulated ROSCAs which have proven popular among 
some Asian immigrant groups in the USA.”).
104. See Turner-Jones, supra note 3; Ardener, supra note 22, at 217; Hossein, supra note 61, 
at 436.
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ROSCAs required the same amount of money, thus she did not feel 
overburdened by membership in multiple ROSCAs.114
With that example in mind, the benefits of ROSCA adoption by 
the African American community become apparent. Adoption by the Af-
rican American community would mean acceptance and utilization of 
ROSCAs amongst African Americans in the same way we see the prac-
tice executed in the Caribbean. One could imagine neighborhoods like 
Brownsville in Brooklyn, Bankhead in Atlanta, the Lower Ninth Ward 
of New Orleans, Oakland, and the Southside of Chicago becoming a 
patchwork of ROSCAs where any given person has access to or mem-
bership in a ROSCA. Thereby, African Americans would not only ob-
tain a level of financial stability thanks to ROSCA membership but also
strengthen community ties and reinvigorate community investment, par-
ticularly so when one recalls the example of ROSCAs operating between 
businesses as well.
ROSCAs could also provide African Americans with benefits by 
serving dually to empower communities and invest in their members.115
In the African American context, like in African and Caribbean immi-
grant communities in Canada, ROSCAs could help organize communi-
ties and build flourishing social economies in a society where the formal 
institutions reject or cast wary glances at people of color in the same way 
the society at large does.116
The COVID-19 pandemic provides an apt demonstration for the 
impact a ROSCA could have on the African American community. Ear-
ly figures from the crisis indicate that African Americans are dispropor-
tionately harmed by the pandemic-induced layoffs and furloughs.117
Economists have suggested that minorities are undoubtedly getting hit 
harder because they often work in hotels, restaurants, and retail businesses 
that are being forced to shut down or reduce service.118 William Rodgers, 
an economist at Rutgers, speculates that the true figure for African 
American unemployment stands at 20.7 percent rather than the official 
rate of 4.1 percent.119 This data highlights the vulnerability of African 
114. Id.
115. See Hossein, supra note 61, at 436.
116. Cf. Hossein, supra note 61, at 38 (quoting Black Canadian women who share their ex-
periences with rejection by financial institutions).
117. Deborah Barfield Berry, Coronavirus Layoffs Disproportionately Hurt Black and Latino 
Workers: ‘It’s Almost like Doomsday Is Coming’, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/03/24/coronavirus-unemployment-
layoffs-blacks-latinos/2900371001/ [https://perma.cc/FGH7-JYMX]; Chris Isidore, Early 
Coronavirus Job Losses Hitting Minorities, Women, Teens Particularly Hard, CNN BUS.
(Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/04/economy/minority-job-losses-coronavirus
/index.html [https://perma.cc/24QT-HX45].
118. Isidore, supra note 117.
119. Id.
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American households, 24 percent of which were unbanked in 2009.120 In 
addition, most American households lack sufficient funds to withstand an 
emergency bill or sudden job loss as of 2016.121
Given these numbers, many African Americans being laid off in the 
midst of this pandemic may not have the means to weather the storm. 
ROSCAs could help. One already participating in a ROSCA before the 
pandemic could adjust to the new situation and reserve one’s pot for pay-
ing rent even if they had other plans for money initially. If a new 
ROSCA is formed during the crisis, the net creditors (those who receive 
their draw in the initial half of the ROSCA cycle) would receive the cash 
infusion necessary to manage the fallout and prepare for the future. 
In both scenarios, there are groups of people who could ostensibly 
be worse off: (1) those who were in a ROSCA before the crisis hit and 
received their pot early, and (2) those who join a ROSCA during the 
crisis and receive a later draw. But that is not the case. To the contrary, 
both groups are better off. First, the former group would potentially have 
cash to join a second ROSCA; and second, the latter group would have 
the opportunity to negotiate for earlier draw positions amongst one an-
other. The specific ROSCA model used could alleviate specific difficul-
ties as well, creating a predetermined ROSCA for those who join to-
gether during the crisis or a ROSCA where one can obtain a second pot 
by adding an extra hand to the pot.122
Naturally, the issue of default remains. ROSCA default is a thorn 
even for the cultures that have traditionally used these funds. Moreover, 
cultural sanctions such as ROSCA-membership exclusion, ostracization 
from the community economy, and loss of social status are rendered im-
potent to a population that has greater access to formal financial institu-
tions,123 that has access to an economy beyond its locality, and that places 
120. INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., THE RACIAL GAP IN SAVINGS AND 
INVESTMENTS 2 (2009), https://insightcced.org/old-site/uploads/CRWG/Racial%20Gap%20
in%20Savings%20and%20Investments%20Spring%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5AV-9SPB].
121. Gillian B. White, Not All Money Troubles Are Created Equal, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/racial-inequality-money-
problems/479349/ [https://perma.cc/L6NJ-KUNR].
122. See, e.g., Ardener, supra note 22, at 211 (describing the South African stokfel, which al-
lows one to make multiple contributions and receive multiple pots commensurate with the 
contributions). This mechanism follows the same rules of reciprocity that defines the South 
African ROSCA and others; i.e., receiving a second fund will require giving double one’s reg-
ular contribution to make up for the receipt of additional monies. See id.
123. Compare DEMIRGUC-KUNT ET AL., supra note 36, at 1 (recording that the number of 
unbanked persons in Latin America and the Caribbean was 61 percent back in 2012) with DIV.
OF DEPOSITOR AND CONSUMER PROT., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 3 (2018) (finding that 20.6 per-
cent of African Americans were unbanked in 2013, 18.2 percent were underbanked in 2015, 
and 16.9 percent were underbanked in 2017).
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less importance on community social status.124 As demonstrated by the 
German Mittelstand, Germany’s highly regarded small to medium-sized 
family owned enterprises,125 such a specific cultural institution may not be 
successful when exported to a new environment.126 Examples in com-
parative law, however, demonstrate that faithful transplantation of a cul-
tural institution can be ensured if safeguards are introduced as well.127
Therefore, to arrive at trust law as the mechanism for ensuring the poten-
tial future success of ROSCAs in the African American community, one 
must consider legal transplantation theory.
II. Importing Asues into the American Context: Cultural and 
Legal Transplant Theories at Work 
ROSCAs are already operating in the United States.128 However,
they have not ventured into the African American community or farther 
than the ethnic groups that brought them to American shores.129 Why the 
institution has not been adopted by African Americans is up for specula-
tion, but the fact remains it is an institution that could find a welcome 
home in the community.130
But there is a problem. Asues, and all other variations of ROSCAs, 
arose in communities to fill a gap. In the Caribbean context, ROSCAs 
address the exclusion of women, Black people, and the lower class from 
traditional means of wealth generation.131 To wit, the histories, politics,
124. See Rhett Jones, Individualism: Eighteenth Century Origins – Twentieth Century Consequenc-
es, 21 W. J. BLACK STUD. 20, 25 (1997) (noting that African Americans display a sort of selfish 
individualism which is highlighted by folk tales such as Brer Rabbit).
125. Brian Blackstone & Vanessa Fuhrmans, The Engines of Growth, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 27, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703509104576329643153915516.
126. Sarah Marsh, Insight: The Mittelstand – One German Product That May Not Be Exportable, 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-mittelstand/insight-
the-mittelstand-one-german-product-that-may-not-be-exportable-
idUSBRE8AD0KV20121114 [https://perma.cc/229P-DYPX].
127. See, e.g., Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globaliza-
tion of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV.
INT’L. L. J. 1, 46-47 (2019) (comparing the German plea-bargaining system, which is vastly 
different from the American model, to the Italian system, which is more faithful to the Ameri-
can plea-bargaining system due to the implementation of the practice with broader criminal 
reforms).
128. See, e.g., Besley et al., supra note 15, at 805 (giving the example of ROSCAs being used 
by ethnic communities in the United States).
129. See id.; Ardener, supra note 22, at 208; Mtshali, supra note 5; PARKER, supra note 103, 
at 282.
130. See Carl Joseph-Black, The Modern-Day SouSou: Community Economics and Financial 
Growth, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ev62yf6x-Mc (dis-
cussing why people should use asues).
131. Hossein, supra note 61, at 426-29; Turner-Jones, supra note 3.
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and will of the people created ROSCAs and laid the foundation for its 
success.132
This is similar to the Mittelstand phenomenon, where nations seek 
to emulate Germany’s unique small to medium enterprise model without 
success.133 Researchers posit that the quintessential German institution is 
well informed by Germany’s history, politics, and economic develop-
ments.134 First, they attest that Germany’s disunity as a patchwork of in-
dependent states, principalities, duchies, and kingdoms from the Middle 
Ages until 1871 led to a pluricentric system of educational, vocational, 
and industrial hubs.135 Second, the Mittelstand model was fomented in the 
aftermath of World War II where the larger corporations that were large-
ly located in major cities were devastated by the Allied bombing and be-
smirched for their association with the Nazis.136 The Mittelstand were left 
to fill the void.137 In short, the essence of German culture produced and 
expanded the Mittelstand model to the enviable position it holds today.138
Because of this, scholars argue it cannot be emulated anywhere else.139
Those who seek to reproduce Mittelstand, even within Germany itself,140
seem to face the same problem: the importing cultures lack one or two 
things that might otherwise ensure its success.141
Therein lies the problem for ROSCA importation into the African 
American context: one cannot try to import a foreign cultural institution 
into a new cultural context and expect it to work at all, let alone work as 
well as it did in the original context. This Part begins by examining the 
theory of cultural transplantation and its more granular cousin, legal 
transplantation. As the name suggests, legal transplantation is the importa-
tion of foreign legal practices and ideas.142 These theories lay the founda-
tion for the assertion that absent an intervening framework, the asue 
model would fail in the African American context. Then, the discussion 
turns to the cultural discrepancies between the ROSCA cultures and Af-
rican American culture that could challenge the transplantation of the in-
stitution. 
132. See Hossein, supra note 61, at 424-27.







140. Id. (citing Jacqueline Henard’s study that argues Germany has failed to emulate the Mit-
telstand model in its former-Eastern states).
141. Id. (“Olga Vaulina, who organized a visit this year of Russian regional officials to Mit-
telstand firms, said most agreed the factor lacking in Russia after decades of communism was 
entrepreneurial spirit - something that is not easy to copy or impose.”).
142. Langer, supra note 127, at 6.
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A.  Cultural and Legal Transplantation 
Just as with goods, ideas are exchanged, transmitted, adopted, and 
shunned. This is even more prominent in the current era where technol-
ogy and interconnectedness spread memes, jokes, films, and other media 
faster than a speeding bullet.143 Scholars such as Anna Malinowska have
analyzed the processes, mechanisms, and systems of this cultural transmis-
sion. Malinowska notes that “difference” is the defining concept in cul-
ture today.144 Cultures define themselves through their differences.145
While these differences can also act as measuring tools for similarity,
across cultures, they more often serve as points of contrast to what is lo-
cal, common, and comfortable within a culture.146 In that way, the con-
cept of differences both explains and corroborates the finding that cultural 
transplants face high rates of rejection.147 The intangibility of culture not-
withstanding, inserting cultural institutions into the figurative cultural 
body148 of a group requires a compatible body as a starting point.149 If a
foreign cultural transplant is unsuitable, it is met with rejection.150
However, Malinowska discusses cultural transplantation in terms of 
spontaneous transmission between cultures.151 Legal transplantation, on 
the other hand, provides examples of planned transmission of cultural in-
stitutions from one legal culture into another.152 There, unsuitability is
143. See Anna Malinowska, Cultural Transplantation and Problems of Transferability, 2 J.
LITERARY STUD. & LINGUISTICS 24, 25 (2014).
144. Id. at 27.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 29.
148. When talking about culture as a whole, as opposed to the granular elements that com-
pose a culture, the forest can be lost for the trees. Therefore, the term “cultural body” is used 
metaphorically to better illustrate the amorphous concept of a single culture of a group. See id.
For example, the culture of the Jewish-Americans includes a host of traditions, practices, and 
history. Rather than using the term “culture” as is, attaching the term “body” or “corpus”
should evoke a unified whole. Moreover, the metaphor of culture as a body composed of 
many integrated systems lends itself well to the discussion of cultural transplantation because 
cultures reject foreign transplants in the same way a body would reject an organ transplant that 
is unsuitable. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. (“In contrast to medical transplants, cultural grafts are not necessarily conscious 
and meticulously planned acts.”).
152. I use “cultural transplant” here liberally. It is my belief that, in this context, laws, legal 
ideologies, and legal institutions are but landmarks in the cultural landscape of a group rather 
than something separate and apart therefrom. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Enduring 
Connections Between Law and Culture: Reviewing Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture, and Oscar 
Chase, Law, Culture, and Ritual, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 101 (2009); Robert Post, Law and 
Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 486 (“Law is thus figured as the arm of a coher-
ent antecedent culture that is the ultimate source of society’s identity and authority.”). Indeed, 
even this mentality can be said to be culturally preconditioned. Cf. id. at 486 (“The common 
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met not with outright rejection but with adaptation, or forced change, of 
the transplant for better accommodation into the importing culture.153
One example of such legal transplantation between cultures is the 
Italian adoption of the American plea-bargaining system.154 Italy is a civil 
law nation boasting legal ancestry tracing back to the Ancient Roman 
codes. Italy’s legal system, in contrast to the Anglo-derived adversarial
system used in America, conducts criminal trials in an inquisitorial man-
ner.155 In an inquisitorial system, the judge helms the official civil or 
criminal investigation as an impartial actor of the state.156 On the other 
hand, in an adversarial system, an active prosecutor aims to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt before a passive judge.157 In short, the inquisi-
torial system of justice is one where judges actively helm inquiries by 
more impartial prosecutors and defense counsels to determine the truth,
whereas the adversarial system is one where impartial judges more pas-
sively mediate aggressive arguing by opposing sides, the end result of such 
arguing being the revelation of the truth.158 The discrepancies between 
the two systems thus become apparent. How then, did Italy fare when it 
sought to transplant portions of the American adversarial system into its 
inquisitorial system, given that the two are nearly antithetical?159 The an-
swer is it did quite well because the drafters cunningly morphed the 
Americanisms into a form palatable to the Italians.160
The applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti (hereinafter “pat-
teggiamento”161) is an agreement between the prosecution and the defense 
to a particular sentence for a criminal defendant.162 They only  bargain for 
the length of the sentence because the Italian system does not incorporate 
the idea of additional charges, and even then, the bargaining process on-
ly applies to offenses with maximum sentences of five years.163 Sentences 
can be reduced by as much as one-third and no longer than two years.164
law in particular self-consciously embodies the “experience” and “custom” of the surrounding 
community. Every time the common law requires a jury to reach a verdict based upon the 
judgment of the “reasonable person,” it seeks to enforce “the general level of moral judgment 
of the community, what it feels ought ordinarily to be done.”).
153. See generally Langer, supra note 127.
154. See generally Pizzi & Marafiotti, supra note 18.
155. Langer, supra note 127, at 6.
156. Id. at 4; See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 18, at 7.
157. Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 18, at 7.
158. See Langer, supra note 127, at 4.
159. Langer, supra note 127, at 46.
160. See id. at 27-28, 46-53.
161. Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 18, at 22 (“[It] is even referred to by Italian lawyers as a 
patteggiamento . . . .”).
162. Id.
163. Langer, supra note 127, at 50.
164. Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 18, at 22.
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The patteggiamento and the other criminal reforms in Italy were in-
stituted to remedy the inefficiency that was rampant in Italy’s older sys-
tem.165 Notwithstanding that reasoning, scholarly reaction to the Italian 
plea bargain was so extreme that it resulted in a slew of articles decrying 
the procedure as compromising the truth-seeking mission of criminal tri-
als.166 In fact, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the law that regu-
lates patteggiamento unconstitutional for failing to expressly grant judges 
power to control, which they found contravened Article 27.3 of the Ital-
ian Constitution.167
However, the constitutional court’s ruling did not eliminate pat-
teggiamento;168 in fact the procedural tool has been used in 17 to 21 per-
cent of misdemeanor-like cases and in 34 to 42 percent of other criminal 
cases, save the most serious.169 Ostensibly, these figures show acceptance 
and utilization of patteggiamento at a healthy rate, but they come from the 
forced change in the plea bargaining system to better suit the Italian pal-
ate.170 The initial resistance to pattegiamento shows exactly what Malinow-
ska suggested: that exchange of foreign cultural institutions causes im-
mune responses in the importing culture.171 Had the patteggiamento been 
introduced informally, rejection would have been highly likely because, 
as the scholars argued, it is not in the nature of the inquisitorial system to 
fast track a case when there is truth to be found.172 But for the careful 
hand of the drafters of the new Italian Criminal Code, the new adversari-
165. Id. at 6; Langer, supra note 127, at 47.
166. Langer, supra note 127, at 52; e.g., LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DIRITTO E RAGIONE: TEORIA 
DEL GARANTISMO PENALE (Laterza ed., 1st ed. 1989); Paolo Ferrua, La Giustizia Negoziata 
nella Crisi della Funzione Cognitiva del Processo Penale, 3 STUDI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 131, 134 
(1997).
167. Langer, supra note 127, at 52 (“The ruling by the constitutional court found the law 
that regulated patteggiamento unconstitutional because it did not expressly give the judge the 
power to control the congruence between the sentence agreed upon by the parties and the 
seriousness of the offense.”). Article 27.3 of Italy’s constitution establishes that the goal of pun-
ishment is the rehabilitation of the convicted person.
168. Compare Corte cost., 26 giu. 1990, n.313, 96 Racc. uff. corte cost. 1990 (dating the 
court’s decision to 1990), with ARMANDO CAPUTO ED., STATISTICHE GIUDIZIARIE PENALI:
ANNO 2004, SISTEMA STATISTICO NAZIONALE 15-16 (2006) http://www.ristretti.it
/areestudio/statistiche/penali_2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/568E-5HSK] (describing what pat-
teggiamento is, basic rules governing its application, and its inapplicability in cases concerning 
juveniles).
169. Langer, supra note 127, at 52-53 (documenting the rate of utilization for patteggiamento
by parties between 1990 and 1998).
170. See Langer, supra note 127, at 53 (“This indicates that the model of the dispute, under-
stood as a structure of interpretation and meaning, has been accepted and internalized, at least 
to ascertain extent, by a substantial number of Italian legal actors.”).
171. See Malinowska, supra note 143, at 29.
172. Cf. Langer, supra note 127, at 4, 36-37 (elucidating the concept that few practices are 
more “incompatible with the inquisitorial system” than plea bargaining.).
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al practices introduced would have failed to change anything.173 In short, 
the drafters ensured the success of patteggiamento by introducing it in a 
framework that provided the proper adoptive conditions to ensure the 
accommodation of the foreign cultural institution. 
B.  Cultural Discrepancy and the Need for an Additional Framework
In comparative law, one school of thought believes that law and le-
gal concepts form a continuum that ranges from those that are easier to 
transplant from their original context to those that are harder.174 Most 
importantly, the continuum theory offers insight into what it would take 
to make a transplantation successful: the harder the legal concept to 
transplant, the more detailed the knowledge that may be required to en-
sure the transplantation.175 That theory fits with transplantation of cultural 
institutions as well; e.g., on the one end cultural staples such as literature 
would prove to be easier to transplant176 and are transferable, whereas on
the other end cultural institutions such as Mittelstand would be more diffi-
cult to transplant.177 ROSCAs, it would seem, sit closer to the easy end of 
the transplantation scale because they have proven highly mobile and 
transplantable.178 In the interest of having the ROSCA take hold and 
flourish in the African American cultural body (i.e., not face cultural re-
jection), perhaps some understanding of the original context in which the 
institution arose is necessary.
Interestingly, the concept of pooling community resources is not 
novel to African Americans, which may help further the transplantation.
For example, the Greenwood district of Tulsa, Oklahoma emerged as 
“Black Wall Street” because of the efforts of O.W. Gurley, a Black land-
173. See id. at 46-47, 52 (“Italian legal translators had much more power than German trans-
lators in advancing their reform, and were able to introduce Italian plea bargaining as part of 
deeper and broader criminal procedure reforms inspired by the American adversarial system.”).
174. Basil C. Bitas, Comparative Theory, Judges and Legal Transplants: A Practical Lesson 
from Singapore and Its Relevance to Transnational Convergence, 26 SING. ACAD. L.J., 50, 54 
(2014).
175. Id. (“Again, whether the success of the transplant would require detailed knowledge of 
the donor country’s legal system and political economy is open to question.” But the example 
comparing commercial law and constitutional/public law is illustrative of the continuum theo-
ry: “His continuum runs from certain types of commercial law that may in some way lie on 
the periphery of a system involving the acquiescence of only a few key stakeholders in order to 
become effective to public or constitutional law which may require broader acceptance from 
the public at large in order to take root in the soil of the recipient country.” Id.).
176. Cf. Malinowska, supra note 143, at 32 (providing the example of the Polish translation 
of 50 Shades of Grey, which encountered problems when translators tried to provide Polish 
equivalents to the salacious terms, but ultimately was popular amongst Poles).
177. See Marsh, supra note 126.
178. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 208-09 (explaining that ROSCAs have not developed 
independently in each community, which was the case for the Ibibio of Nigeria).
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owner who purchased the land and named it Greenwood.179 Gurley lured 
fellow African Americans with boarding houses and furnished them with 
loans to start businesses. Soon, other Black entrepreneurs followed suit.180
J.B. Stradford, a prominent Black entrepreneur and Greenwood resident, 
is said to have believed that “blacks had a better chance of economic 
progress if they pooled their resources.”181 These concepts are the heart of 
the ROSCA model and serve as added evidence that ROSCAs not only 
would be welcomed into the African American context but would flour-
ish in the same way Greenwood did, especially considering that business-
es can also form ROSCAs amongst themselves. While such a background
may allow for the successful transplantation of ROSCAs, it may not be 
enough guarantee that ROSCAs will operate in the same way, and thus 
retain the same benefits, as they do in the originating cultures.
Shirley Ardener recounts that the Ibibio people of Nigeria bor-
rowed their ROSCA system from the Ibo people fifty years prior to her 
writing.182 Still, the Ibibio ROSCA system is vastly different from that of
the Ibo people.183 Therein lies the crucial point: ease of transplantability 
does not ensure one-to-one transplantation where the transplant is a sub-
stantially similar entity to the originating culture’s incarnation.
The one case where we have seen the benefits of the original system 
carried over was the measured and contextualized transplantation of the 
plea bargain into the Italian criminal system. The goal of transplanting the 
American plea bargain into the Italian criminal system was to introduce a 
mechanism to reduce the perennial backlog of court cases,184 and the data
shows that patteggiamento is indeed succeeding.185
Therefore, like in the Italian example, proper controls must be put 
in place to prevent the rejection of ROSCAs in the African American
context, and to ensure that ROSCAs’ benefits of inducing savings, 
providing credit, and incentivizing community investment remain part 
and parcel of the transplanted institution. Because the largest drawbacks
to ROSCA use are the potentials for default and absconding, introducing 
a legal framework to curtail those possibilities would serve to prevent 
transplant rejection while still encouraging the natural adaptation of 
ROSCAs to the African American context.
179. Alexis Clark, Tulsa’s ‘Black Wall Street’ Flourished as a Self-Contained Hub in Early 1900s, 
HISTORY: HISTORY STORIES (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/black-wall-
street-tulsa-race-massacre [https://perma.cc/FN4B-SCS2] (last updated Jan. 2, 2020).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 208.
183. Id. at 209.
184. Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 18, at 17 (“The new Code was, in significant part, intend-
ed to provide the Italian criminal justice system with new, efficient procedures to combat its 
perennial case backlog.”).
185. Langer, supra note 127, at 52.
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III. Trusts ‘R’ Us
One of the key aspects of ROSCAs is their informality. The grass-
roots nature of the institution legitimizes it more in the minds of the dis-
enfranchised because it stems from the locality and the casual human 
connections between community members.186 Indeed, the history of dis-
crimination and predation on African Americans by formal financial insti-
tutions explicably serves to keep the community wary of them.187 There-
fore, this Article should not be construed as seeking to introduce 
ROSCAs into the American context with formal institutionalization be-
cause their informality is their strength. Rather, the argument is that to 
better ensure the adoption of the ROSCA into African American cul-
ture, controls should be introduced to prevent the loss of ROSCA bene-
fits and to limit ROSCA drawbacks. By using trust law as a stabilizing 
mechanism, African Americans could utilize ROSCAs without fear of 
forfeiting their money on a fool’s errand. 
Trust law should be used over other branches of civil law because 
trust law best maps onto the ROSCA scheme. In other countries, legal 
recourse for ROSCAs is based in contract law.188 In the Bahamas, for ex-
ample, the previously mentioned case of the failed ROSCA involved 
four women who paid over $6,000 into an asue that subsequently 
failed.189 The women brought the custodian of the asue to court relying 
upon the law of obligations.190 In that case, the women were able to pro-
duce contracts and receipts given to them by the custodian.191 The victo-
ry by the Bahamian women is the best case for contract law because it 
illustrates a successful suit under a valid contract between asue members 
and the custodian. Further, the law of obligations could work well be-
cause it can cover even oral agreements between members and evidence 
of payment can be corroborated to provide even the most basic of the 
equitable remedies.192
186. See Hossein, supra note 61, at 431-32.
187. See R. Robin McDonald, ‘Banking While Black:’ Lawsuit Claims Wells Fargo Called Police 
Instead of Cashing Woman’s Check, LAW.COM (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.law.com
/dailyreportonline/2019/12/04/banking-while-black-lawsuit-claims-wells-fargo-called-police-
instead-of-cashing-womans-check/?slreturn=20200827233902 [https://perma.cc/F3ET-
M682]; Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Accused of Preying on Black and Latino Homebuyers in California, 
CNN BUS. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/27/investing/wells-fargo-
sacramento-lawsuit-discriminatory-lending/index.html [https://perma.cc/9UB2-B97F]; 
SARAH BURD-SHARPS & REBECCA RASCH, IMPACT OF THE US HOUSING CRISIS ON THE 
RACIAL WEALTH GAP ACROSS GENERATIONS, SOC. SCI. RSCH. COUNCIL 9-14 (2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/discrimlend_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RG9Q-ACE7].
188. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 217; Maycock, supra note 17.
189. Maycock, supra note 17.
190. Id.
191. See Maycock, supra note 17.
192. See, e.g., id.
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However, a passing comment by Shirley Ardener provides an apt 
counter: “The legal validity of the contract between a member and an 
association may vary.”193 It stands to reason that to have the best chance 
of winning a contract case, one should have a formal written document 
that explicitly lays out the terms, conditions, and minutiae governing the 
parties’ activities.194 While that is entirely possible to achieve, the more 
intricate a contract, the higher the possibility that the community will re-
ject it.195 As seen in the comments by Jamaican ROSCA participants 
documented by Caroline Hossein, the lack of paperwork is seen as one of 
the factors that endear them to the ROSCAs rather than formal institu-
tions.196 The preferred lack of such “rigamarole” likely stems from the 
distrust of the formal financial institutions that are seen as for the rich, 
educated, and the “big man.”197 Hence, contract law, while applicable, 
may serve to stifle the African American ROSCA project in its infancy 
rather than secure its growth into maturity.198
But there is another option: trust law. If we want immediate im-
plementation of ROSCAs into the community, particularly given the
current state of affairs with the devastation the pandemic is causing the 
African American population,199 trust law can quickly retain the informal-
ity of ROSCAs, encompass any permutation that African Americans in-
troduce to the ROSCA model, and align with the Restatement Third of 
Trusts no matter the iteration.
193. Ardener, supra note 22, at 217.
194. Andrew C. Vredenburg, Get It in Writing: The Importance of Written Agreements in Busi-
ness, FOSTER SWIFT COLLINS & SMITH PC (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.fosterswift.com
/communications-Written-Business-Agreements.html [https://perma.cc/Y782-SLZ6].
195. See Hossein, supra note 61, at 432.
196. See id. at 431.
197. See id. at 432.
198. This is certainly the case when one considers that a written contract implicates the pa-
rol-evidence rule.
199. See Oliver Laughland & Lauren Zanolli, Why Is Coronavirus Taking Such a Deadly Toll on 
Black Americans?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020
/apr/25/coronavirus-racial-disparities-african-americans [https://perma.cc/C96K-2SVG] (in-
vestigating how the virus has ravaged the African American community physically); Berry, su-
pra note 117 (documenting how the virus has ravaged the African American community finan-
cially); Isidore supra note 117 (documenting how the virus has ravaged the African American 
community financially).
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A.  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts and ROSCAs
1.  Background on Trusts
A trust is defined as a fiduciary relationship in which one person 
holds a property interest subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use 
that interest for the benefit of another.200 A fiduciary relationship is one 
where a person is under a duty to act for the benefit of another as to mat-
ters within the scope of the relationship.201 The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts notes that in some circumstances fiduciary duties may technically 
exist but may not be “effectively enforceable.”202 In those cases, the trus-
tee holds powers such as revocation or an exercisable power of appoint-
ment or withdrawal.203 The creator of a trust is known as a settlor,204 and 
a trust may have more than one.205 The property held in trust is managed 
by the trustee206 and is known as trust property or trust res.207 The one for 
whom the property is held in trust is known as the beneficiary.208 The 
settlor and trustee can both be beneficiaries of a trust unless the trustee is 
the sole beneficiary of the trust.209
An entity is considered a trust if it fulfills three elements: (1) pres-
ence of a trustee who holds the trust property and is subject to duties to 
manage it for the benefit of one or more others; (2) one or more benefi-
ciaries, to whom and for whose benefit the trustee owes the duties with 
respect to the trust property; and (3) trust property, which is held by the 
trustee for the beneficiaries.210
There must also be a proper manifestation of intention by the settlor 
to create a trust;211 whether the settlor knows the relationship is called a 
trust is immaterial.212 Oral inter vivos trusts (trusts created orally and during 
the life of the settlor rather than via a will) are recognized and enforcea-
ble so long as the Statute of Frauds does not apply.213 Further, to create a 
trust by a mechanism other than a will there must be either: (1) a transfer 
inter vivos by a property owner to another person as trustee for one or 
200. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (Am. L. Inst. 2012) (citing George G. Bogert & 
George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 1 (rev. 2d ed. 1984)).
201. Id. § 2(b).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 3(1).
205. Id. § 3 cmt. a (“A trust may have more than one settlor.”).
206. Id. § 3(3).
207. Id. § 3(2) cmt b.
208. Id. § 3(4).
209. Id. § 3 cmt. d.
210. Id. § 2-3 (including property as an element of the definition of a trust).
211. Id. § 13.
212. Id. § 13 cmt. a.
213. Id. § 20.
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more persons;214 (2) a declaration by a property owner that he or she 
holds that property as trustee for one or more persons;215 (3) an exercise 
of a power of appointment by appointing property to a person as trustee 
for one or more persons who are objects of that power;216 or (4) a prom-
ise or beneficiary designation that creates enforceable rights in a person 
who immediately or later holds those rights as trustee, or who pursuant
to those rights later receives property as trustee, for one or more per-
sons.217 The drafters of the Restatement took care to note that in situa-
tions where there are multiple beneficiaries, a trustee or settlor-trustee 
may also be a beneficiary.218
2.  Trust Applicability to ROSCAs
To exemplify how trust law could apply to ROSCAs, we shall re-
visit the previously mentioned case of the failed asue in the Bahamas—
although with the slight change of supposing that the women did not 
have a written contract for the asue. Recalling the facts of the case, at 
least four women—Patricia Collie, Nishka Shepherd, Shikia Saunders, 
and Keisa Pinder—joined together to pool money into an asue overseen 
by custodian Juanita Stubbs.219 The asue started on September 24, 2015 
and was set to end on February 28, 2016.220 Collie invested $1,625, 
Shepherd invested $1,750, Saunders likely invested $1,500,221 and Pinder 
likely invested $1,750 as well.222 Collie, Shepherd, and Pinder were given 
the draw dates of December 18, 2015 and January 8, 2016.223
Stubbs, as the asue custodian, was in charge of gathering the contri-
butions from all members, collecting them into a single pot, and then 
giving the pot to the owner of each draw.224 In essence, Stubbs had a du-
ty to ensure (1) the existence of the pot and (2) that the pot was given to 
the designated recipient.225
In the American trust law context, this falls exactly into the defini-
tion of a fiduciary relationship because Stubbs operated as custodian on 
214. Id. § 10 (b).
215. Id. § 10 (c).
216. Id. 10 (d).
217. Id. § 10 (e).
218. Id. § 10 cmt. a.
219. Maycock, supra note 17.
220. Id.
221. See id. The article stipulates that she was owed a balance of $1,200 after she received a 
$300 payment from Stubbs.
222. See id. The same math as mentioned in the previous footnote guides the figure I used 
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behalf of the asue members.226 Her collection and disbursement of the pot 
were to the benefit of the asue members in ensuring the continuance of 
the asue and fulfilling its purpose. Therefore, Stubbs was effectively a 
trustee, which was exactly what opened her up to liabilities when the 
asue failed.
In this framework, the pot was the trust property because it was 
what the trustee, Stubbs, held for the asue members. The four members, 
Collie, Shepherd, Saunders, and Pinder, were the beneficiaries because
Stubbs managed the pot for their benefit. In this example, Collie, Shep-
herd, Saunders, and Pinder also served jointly as the settlors because they 
were the ones who put forth the money to create the pot, or trust prop-
erty. Additionally, it is the members’ decision to join together into an 
asue that serves as the manifest intention to form a trust. The act of dis-
bursing the money the first time serves as the inter vivos transfer that cre-
ates the asue and the trust. As a final point, because the pot does not per-
tain to real estate or the sale of goods nor the asue extend beyond the 
lifetime of the members, the Statue of Frauds and could therefore remain 
a hypothetical oral inter vivos trust.227
It is clear that trust law is well applicable to asues when conceptual-
ized as standard trusts where the custodian is the trustee. However, that 
conceptualization does little to prevent or ensnare beneficiaries seeking to 
abscond with the pot without paying their dues. A bit more radical of an 
interpretation of trust law, notwithstanding its contortion, would capture 
the nefarious asue member while still in line with the Restatement of 
Trusts: that is, considering the asue members to be trustees, in addition to 
settlors and beneficiaries.
The Restatement includes the word “settlor-trustee” in its descrip-
tion of possible beneficiaries.228 Hence, it is entirely cognizable that one 
person may wear all three hats of settlor, trustee, and beneficiary provided 
that there are multiple beneficiaries such that the doctrine of merger229
does not apply.230 With that in mind, one can return to the facts of the 
Bahamian asue and slot the facts into place. 
In this iteration, Collie, Shepherd, Saunders, and Pinder are settlors 
that give to each other a draw in trust. The draw is essentially an interest 
in the asue, or more specifically an interest in the pot. Therefore, the 
226. See id. § 2 cmt. b.
227. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (AM. L. INST. 2012); see also Statute of Frauds, LEGAL INFO. INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statute_of_frauds [https://perma.cc/QE8R-M34M] (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2020). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (a); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 5-701 
(a); MO. REV. STAT. § 432.010.
228. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 2012).
229. The doctrine of merger in trust law is the rule that states that a trust will end if the same 
person holds all of the legal and equitable title. See CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & CHARLES E.
ROUNDS, III, LORING AND ROUNDS: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK § 8.7 (Wolters Kluwer ed. 
2013).
230. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 69.
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draw is a secondary trust res. Another way to conceive of the asue is as
two overlapping trusts operating as one: the first trust involving the cus-
todian holding the pot in trust for the members, the second trust involv-
ing the members holding a draw in trust, where the asue members them-
selves are the trustees who are granted their draws from the collectivity.
In the first trust, the pot is the trust res, the securing of which assures that 
the beneficial interest, the sum of the pot, is passed to the member-
beneficiaries by the custodian-trustee. In the second trust, the draw is the 
trust res where it serves as the interest in the pot.231 Hence, the asue 
members need not function as custodians to be considered trustees be-
cause their overlapping interest in the pot, represented by the draw, is 
sufficient to attach fiduciary duties.
To better understand it, Collie, Shepherd, Saunders, and Pinder all 
have a lot in the draw, which means they each hold an interest in the 
pot. The absence of one draw holder breaks the asue because it is predi-
cated upon all members being present and paying the contribution.232
Thus, if Collie were to defect from the asue, the pot could no longer 
continue, and the asue would default. There is thus a clear fiduciary rela-
tionship between asue members where the duty to one another is a duty 
of care to ensure the existence of the pot by continued participation.
Moreover, for the purpose of the second trust, the duty attached to 
the members does not extinguish with one’s acquisition of the pot. One 
obtainment of the pot does not mean the pot disappears. If anything, the 
pot is in existence from the moment the asue is created until the moment 
it ends. That idea follows from the fact that the draws of the other mem-
ber-beneficiaries remain after one of the members receives her pot. In 
other words, one attainment of the pot does not cease its existence pre-
cisely because that act does not do away with the other draws and one’s 
obligations to the other members of the asue. Therefore, the asue can be 
easily secured by trust law from nefarious members if one were to regard 
the members as settlor-trustee-beneficiaries. With the asue established as a 
private inter vivos trust, all of the remedies available to beneficiaries when 
there is a breach of trust become available in case of default or theft such 
as specific performance (compelling a trustee to continue payments from 
the trust)233 and injunction.234
In summation, ROSCAs, and asues specifically, operate well within 
the bounds of trust law. Arguably, knowing trust law applies to ROSCAs 
would induce the view that they are actually trusts in another form. Laws 
231. See id. § 3 cmt. b (“The term ‘trust property’ denotes things or the interests in things 
that are held in trust.”) (“Although property held in trust usually consists of legal interests in 
tangible or intangible things, equitable interests also can be held in trust.”).
232. See Ardener, supra note 22, at 211 (“Regularity in the payment of contributions has 
been singled out as one of the criteria distinguishing rotating-credit from some other institu-
tions.”).
233. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95.
234. Id.
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have the power to shape attitudes and perceptions, and this case would be 
no different.235 Certainly knowing something is illegal changes one’s per-
ception of the act, thus it stands to reason that such a concept extends to 
how one views institutions themselves. In the case of ROSCAs, using the 
framework of trust law to highlight the illegality and disfavor of default 
and asportation primes the entire conceptualization of a ROSCA to bring 
it closer to something culturally American. Utilizing trust law to frame 
African Americans’ conceptualization of ROSCAs equivocates to a new 
understanding of ROSCAs as trusts by African Americans. As seen with 
the influence of fake news, initial information informs perceptions which
shape reality and incline people toward the initial information offered.236
By characterizing ROSCAs as trusts, the cognition of the institution may
change two-fold: first, it may turn an amorphous concept into one that is 
readily cognizable, i.e., swapping the unknown ROSCA for the widely 
recognized trust; and, second, it would prime the perception of the 
ROSCA. To put the second point in a different way, in the same way a 
watermelon grown in a box will grow to fill the box, so too might char-
acterizing ROSCAs (the watermelon) as trusts (the box) allow the per-
ception of the institution to grow into the trust mold in the minds of Af-
rican Americans. The results, then, are clear: trust law as the 
transplantation stabilizer secures the ROSCA from cultural rejection be-
cause it mitigates the known drawback of the institution and explains the 
institution in a way familiar to the culture so that its perception is both 
recognizable and understandable.
Conclusion
Marsha Curry may have grown up humbly in the Bahamas, but her 
ingenuity with the tools given to her allowed her to reach a point where 
she could secure herself, her children, and even her grandchildren.
Through her cunning and crafty use of asues, Curry was able to buy mul-
tiple houses, invest in land, and put her children through school. While 
her resourcefulness was all her own, the opportunity came through the 
ROSCA scheme. Similar opportunities could be potent in the African 
American context. Even the least sagacious user receives benefits from 
ROSCAs, and in the hands of the gifted there is no telling how much 
they could achieve.
235. See Cevat G. Aksoy, Christopher S. Carpenter, Ralph D. Haas & Kevin Tran, Do Laws 
Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe, 124 
EUR. ECON. REV. 1, (2020); René D. Flores, Do Anti-Immigrant Laws Shape Public Senti-
ment? A Study of Arizona’s SB 1070 Using Twitter Data, 123 AM. J. SOCIO. 333, 366 (2017).
236. Peter J. Jost, Johanna Pünder & Isabell Schulze-Lohoff, Fake News – Does Perception Mat-
ter More Than the Truth?, 85  J. BEHAVIORAL & EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 1, 2 (2020) (finding 
both in the literature and their experiment that people rely heavily on an initial piece of infor-
mation offered to make subsequent judgments during decision making).
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The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the plight of the African 
American financial situation. The necessity for emergency savings or 
emergency funds is now more present than at any time after the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis.237 Transmission of ROSCAs into the African American 
community, however, could change this tragic narrative into a come-
back-kid tale. Wherever they are used, ROSCAs induce savings, provide
potential for interest-free loans, act as emergency funds, and empower 
communities—particularly ostracized ones. The drawbacks of lack of in-
terest on the money one puts in and fees to the custodian are mitigated 
by the built-in benefits: the money one puts in remains in circulation in 
the community’s economy (a bigger boon collectively than five cents of 
interest generated on a savings account), and fees can be factored into the 
systematic payments one puts into the pot. The main drawbacks are the 
risks of default and theft, which stand to be the biggest impediment to 
cultural transplantation. 
Trust law is the solution to the draw back and should thus be used 
as the context stabilizer. When a legal institution is transplanted from one 
culture to another, it needs a transplant stabilizer to prevent cultural re-
jection by the importing community. Like the Italian plea bargain, the 
stabilizer should frame the transplant in a way that is cognizable to the 
importing culture while ensuring the benefits seen in the originating cul-
ture. Having identified the risks of default and asportation as the most 
prescient drawbacks to importing ROSCAs to America, trust law can 
neatly fill the void that socio-cultural punishments of ROSCA cultures 
leave behind. 
ROSCAs already operate as trusts. Custodians act as trustees who 
hold the pot in trust, and the members of the ROSCA are simultaneously 
settlor-trustee-beneficiaries by virtue of the fact they all receive the bene-
fit of the ROSCA while holding duties to the ROSCA and to one an-
other. Consideration of ROSCAs as trust for legal purposes thus doubly 
secures the institution from cultural rejection: the legal remedies available 
to beneficiaries for breach of trust are made available to prevent or rectify 
default or asportation, and the imagining of the institution as a trust 
makes it more recognizable and less foreign to the African American 
community.
Greenwood, Oklahoma was razed to the ground, but the ideas that 
led to its foundation and flourishing as Black Wall Street did not leave 
this earth. If anything, ROSCAs are antecedents and continuations of 
that ideology of community empowerment. Introducing ROSCAs into 
the African American community will serve as a boon to a people who 
have been ostracized by formal institutions for their entire history. With 
the transplantation of ROSCAs into African American communities, the 
237. See Paul Krugman, Coming Next: The Greater Recession, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/opinion/coronavirus-us-recession.html.
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attainment of financial savings and community context are sureties, and 
the potential for emergence of an army of Marsha Currys is infinite.

